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THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR
RELATIONS: QUO VADIS, AMERICA?
Nicole L. Aeschleman*
I. INTRODUCTION
The application of international law, and specifically of
International Court of Justice ("ICJ")1 decisions, in U.S. do-
mestic courts is a contentious issue in the United States.
More than thirty-five years after the ratification of the Vi-
enna Convention on Consular Relations ("Vienna Convention"
or "Convention"),2 a multilateral treaty enacted to protect for-
eign nationals who have been detained by law enforcement
officials in a signatory nation,3 and the Optional Protocol on
Disputes, a treaty accompanying the Convention that gives
the ICJ compulsory jurisdiction over "disputes arising out of
the interpretation or application of the Convention,'" the
United States government remains irresolute about the ap-
plicability of these treaties in the U.S. domestic court system.
The uncertainty persists despite two ICJ decisions find-
ing that the ICJ has jurisdiction over Vienna Convention
claims, as proscribed by the Optional Protocol, and that the
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1. The International Court of Justice ("ICJ") is the principal judiciary or-
gan for the United Nations. The ICJ, which replaced the Permanent Court of
International Justice in 1946, serves two functions: (1) to settle legal disputes
submitted to it by States by applying international law; and (2) to provide advi-
sory opinions on legal questions presented by approved international organs
and agencies. INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, GENERAL INFORMATION: THE
COURT AT A GLANCE, at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/icjgnnot.html (last visited Aug. 7, 2005).
2. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77,
596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
3. Id.
4. Vienna Convention, 21 U.S.T. at 326, 596 U.N.T.S. at 428.
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United States violated its duties under the Convention.5
These ICJ decisions held that the U.S. habeas corpus proce-
dure violates the Vienna Convention when it prevents foreign
nationals from having their U.S. convictions and sentences
reviewed and reconsidered in light of alleged Convention vio-
lations.' The U.S. Supreme Court's current position on this
issue, based on its latest case ruling, is that banning such re-
view, through the application of state procedural defaults, is
appropriate. Thus, the LCJ decisions conflict with the law of
the United States.
Recent developments in Vienna Convention law7 necessi-
tated a response and a clarification of the law by the U.S.
government. The U.S. Supreme Court responded by granting
certiorari in Medellin v. Dretke,8 in which the issue was the
applicability, in U.S. domestic courts, of the ICJ's decision in
Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals
("Avena").9 The Court heard oral arguments on March 28,
2005.
On May 23, 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a 5-4 deci-
sion, dismissed as improvidently granted the writ of certiorari
in Medellin."0 The Court's ruling was based on the fact that
Medellin had filed a successive state application for a writ of
habeas corpus and that the state court "may provide Medellin
with the review and reconsideration of his Vienna Convention
claim that the ICJ required" and which was sought by Medel-
lin on his writ to the U.S. Supreme Court.1 An insightful
footnote included by the Court is that:
Medellin, or the State of Texas, can seek certiorari in this
Court from the Texas courts' disposition of the state ha-
beas corpus application. In that instance, this Court
5. See LaGrand (FRG v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27) at http://www.icj-
cij.org (last visited Aug. 7, 2005); Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31) at http://www.icj-cij.org (last
visited Aug. 7, 2005).
6. See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 466; Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexi-
can Nationals, 2004 I.C.J. 128.
7. See discussion infra Part I.D.
8. Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S.
Ct. 686 (2004).
9. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, 2004 I.C.J. 128.
Avena held that the United States violated its obligations under the Vienna
Convention. See id. See also discussion infra Part II.D.
10. Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2088, 2089 (2005).
11. Id.
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would in all likelihood have an opportunity to review the
Texas courts' treatment of the President's memorandum
and Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals
(Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. No. 128 (Judgment of Mar. 31),
unencumbered by the issues that arise from the proce-
dural posture of this action. 12
While a future response by the U.S. Supreme Court in Medel-
lin may aid in clarifying the issues, this recent dismissal does
not address the problems regarding Vienna Convention law
that face the United States. 3 This comment examines the is-
sues confronting the United States,and proposes a plan of ac-
tion to clarify and resolve them.
Part II of this comment provides a background of Article
36 of the Vienna Convention, 4 the writ of habeas corpus, 5
U.S. and ICJ cases presenting Vienna Convention claims, 6
and recent developments in Vienna Convention law, including
an overview of Medellin and governmental reactions to this
case.17 Part III identifies the problems related to (1) non-
compliance with the Vienna Convention and ICJ decisions, (2)
allowing the conflict between ICJ and U.S. Supreme Court
holdings to continue, and (3) recent U.S. governmental ac-
tions.'" Part IV analyzes the non-compliance of the United
States and the conflict that has consequently arisen. 9 Part
IV also evaluates the measures the government has imple-
mented."° Part V establishes a plan of action for the United
States to undertake with respect to clarifying its domestic
policies and regaining the confidence and respect of the inter-
national legal community.'
12. Id. at 2090 n.1.
13. As of the time this comment was submitted to publication, this was the
latest development. However, since the area of law is ever-changing, there may
be further advancements in the law by the time the article is published.
14. See discussion infra Part II.A.
15. See discussion infra Part II.B.
16. See discussion infra Part II.C.
17. See discussion infra Part II.D.
18. See discussion infra Part III.
19. See discussion infra Part IV.
20. See discussion infra Part IV.
21. See discussion infra Part V.
939
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations is a self-
executing treaty22 drafted in 1963 in Vienna and entered into
force in 1969.2 The U.S. Senate ratified both this treaty and
the accompanying Optional Protocol on Disputes. 4 The Op-
tional Protocol, also a treaty, expands the rights and obliga-
tions of Vienna Convention signatory parties by giving the
ICJ compulsory jurisdiction to handle claims that require in-
terpretation or application of the Convention." Since the Op-
tional Protocol is a treaty, it is binding upon all signatory par-
ties, including the United States."
Article 36, paragraph one, of the Vienna Convention out-
lines the treaty obligations for treatment of detained foreign
nationals. These obligations include: (1) the detaining au-
thority must notify the detained foreign national of his right
to consular assistance, and if he requests it, the authorities
must inform, without delay, the consular of the foreign na-
tional's state; (2) consular officers must be permitted to com-
municate with and have access to their nationals, and the na-
tionals must have the same privilege with respect to
communication and access to their consular officers; and (3)
22. A self-executing treaty does not require domestic action in order for it to
become domestically enforceable. Becoming a party initiates the treaty and its
accompanying obligations. WIKIPEDIA: THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, TREATY at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty#Execution-and-implementation (last modi-
fied May 15, 2005).
23. See Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 36(1), 21 U.S.T. at 100, 596
U.N.T.S. at 293.
24. Vienna Convention, 21 U.S.T. at 326, 596 U.N.T.S. at 428.
25. See Vienna Convention, 21 U.S.T. at 326-27, 596 U.N.T.S. at 428-29.
Since it is an optional protocol, signatories to the Vienna Convention treaty may
elect whether to ratify it in addition to the principal treaty.
26. Treaties are the "supreme Law of the Land" in the United States and,
therefore, are superceded in authority only by the U.S. Constitution and federal
statutes. U.S. CONST. art. VI., cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause in the U.S. Consti-
tution states the following:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
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the detaining authority must allow the consulate to visit and
provide counsel for the detained foreign national.27 Para-
graph two of Article 36 requires that the domestic laws of
member states give full effect, without hindrance, to para-
graph one of the Article.28 In other words, domestic laws and
procedures may not preclude application of the foreign na-
tionals' rights and remedies as afforded by the treaty.
B. The Writ of Habeas Corpus and the Procedural Default
Doctrine
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a civil action re-
quiring the respondent, usually the detaining official, to jus-
tify withholding the petitioner's liberty. 9 The petitioner must
file the federal habeas petition within one year of exhausting
direct appeals, and the claim must allege a violation of consti-
tutional, federal, or treaty law.30 The petitioner must also ex-
haust all state remedies, including state habeas actions, be-
fore a federal habeas petition can be granted.3
A federal district court's review of a state prisoner's ha-
beas petition is a review of the lawfulness of the petitioner's
custody, and not a review of the state court's judgment.32 The
independent and adequate state ground doctrine33 may bar
27. See id.
28. See id. Paragraph two states:
[t]he rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exercised
in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State, sub-
ject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must
enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights ac-
corded under this Article are intended.
Id.
29. LINDA E. CARTER & ELLEN KREITZBERG, UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT LAW 198 (Lexis Nexis 2004).
30. Id. at 200-01.
31. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (2000); see also CARTER & KREITZBERG, supra
note 29, at 201-02. The requirement that the petitioner exhaust state remedies
is obligatory so that the role of state courts in the enforcement of federal law is
protected. Additionally, it avoids any disruption of state judicial proceedings
that might occur if the federal court intervenes, preventing the state court from
correcting any potential errors. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of
Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 490-91 (1973).
32. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 430-31 (1963) (deciding the relationship
between state procedural default rules and federal habeas reviews).
33. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991). The independent and
adequate state ground doctrine states that federal courts will not review ques-
tions of federal law that have been decided by a state court when the court's de-
cision rests on state law, procedural or substantive, which is independent from
941
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federal habeas review of a prisoner's habeas claim if a state
court's decision not to address a prisoner's federal claims is
based on the prisoner's failure to satisfy a state procedural
requirement.34 The purpose of the independent and adequate
state ground doctrine is "grounded in concerns of comity35 and
federalism" and serves to prevent federal courts from taking
action in a matter when the state court has not had such an
opportunity on direct appeal." A petitioner, therefore, may
have exhausted all direct appeals and habeas review in state
court and still have the claim denied consideration in a fed-
eral habeas proceeding if the petitioner procedurally defaults
in state court. Procedural default may occur if the petitioner
fails to raise a constitutional, federal, or treaty law claim in
state court; and it may bar the petitioner from raising the
claim in federal court.37 Federal habeas review will be barred
unless the petitioner can prove cause and actual prejudice
arising from the alleged violation of federal law, or demon-
strate that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will result if
the claim is barred. 8
A petitioner who has met the statute of limitations, ex-
hausted state remedies, and avoided procedural default may
ask for an evidentiary hearing, as opposed to having the fed-
the federal question presented adequate to support the court's judgment. Id.
34. See id. at 729-31.
35. Id. at 730. In this instance, comity refers to the federal courts giving
full effect to state judgments without reexamination of the merits of the deci-
sion, as long as the court was impartial and satisfied due process requirements.
This comment also refers to comity of foreign judgments, specifically ICJ deci-
sions. These comity references follow the definition that a foreign judgment is
given effect without reexamination of the merits of the decision, provided that
the court rendering the judgment had jurisdiction, the court was impartial, its
procedures satisfied due process, and there is no "special reason why the comity
of this nation should not allow it full effect." Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202
(1895).
36. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 730-31.
37. See CARTER &KREITZBERG, supra note 29, at 202.
38. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. Cause is a high standard to meet and often
premised on ineffectiveness of counsel. Vienna Convention allegations not pre-
sented on direct review are often missed because of the attorney's failure to rec-
ognize the existence of the treaty right. However, this ignorance does not con-
stitute cause because the existence of the treaty right is readily accessible
through research. See Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97, 100 (4th Cir. 1997).
If cause is not met, it is irrelevant whether there is prejudice. The second ex-
ception, fundamental miscarriage of justice, also has a high standard because it
requires the petitioner to show "innocence of the crime" by preponderance of the
evidence. See CARTER & KREITZBERG, supra note 29, at 203-04.
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eral courts decide the merits based on the record.39 Hearings
are either mandatory because of a failure to receive a "full
and fair" hearing, subject to the discretion of the federal
court, or forbidden.4' A petitioner is barred from receiving an
evidentiary hearing in certain cases, such as:
[ilf the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of
a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold
an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant
shows that (A) the claim relies on-(i) a new rule of consti-
tutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral re-
view by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavail-
able; or (ii) a factual predicate that could not have been
previously discovered through the exercise of due dili-
gence; and (B) the facts underlying the claim would be suf-
ficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that
but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would
have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.4'
Therefore, if a petitioner fails to develop a factual basis
for a Vienna Convention claim during state proceedings, the
petitioner will be denied the evidentiary hearing. Neither of
the two exceptions to the bar of an evidentiary hearing can be
satisfied in the Vienna Convention context. First, Vienna
Convention rights are not constitutional law (and thus not
new constitutional law) and due diligence would lead to the
discovery of the factual predicate." Failure by counsel to dis-
cover the right or to develop the factual record does not re-
move the bar.43 Second, even if the petitioner could satisfy
one of the factors, it would be very difficult to prove that if the
petitioner had been afforded his Convention rights, he would
have been found innocent.
If the federal district court denies a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, the petitioner must receive a certificate of ap-
pealability ("COA") from the circuit court in order for the
court of appeals to hear the case." A COA will only be
granted if the "applicant has made a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right."45 This standard can be
39. Id. at 204.
40. See id.
41. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (2000).
42. See CARTER & KREITZBERG, supra note 29, at 205.
43. See id.
44. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
45. Id.
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met if it is shown that "jurists of reason" could disagree with
the resolution of the constitutional claims, by the district
court, or that jurists could decide that the issues presented
are worthy of further review."
Following the federal habeas doctrine, the U.S. Supreme
Court, in three cases alleging Vienna Convention violations,
denied review of or affirmed lower courts' decisions, in which
petitions for writs of habeas corpus were denied based on the
application procedural default doctrine.4 7 Recently, the Court
heard oral arguments in Medellin about whether the Fifth
Circuit's denial of a COA was appropriate in light of the ICJ
decision, Avena.
C. History of Vienna Convention Cases: Domestic and
International
The United States has repeatedly violated its Vienna
Convention obligations, causing significant conflict between
itself and other treaty members. Since 1998, Paraguay, Ger-
many, and Mexico brought cases to the ICJ alleging U.S. vio-
lations of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. 8 The allega-
tions include the United States' failure to inform foreign
nationals, without delay, of their right to consular assistance,
failure to provide adequate review and reconsideration of Vi-
enna Convention violation claims, and defiance of ICJ provi-
sional orders to stay executions in pending ICJ cases. 9 Vi-
46. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003).
47. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998); LaGrand v. Arizona, 526 U.S.
1001 (1999); Torres v. Mullin, 540 U.S. 1035 (2003).
48. See Application Instituting Proceedings Submitted by the Government
of Paraguay (Para. v. U.S.) (Apr. 3, 1998) at http'J/www.icj-cij.org (last visited
Aug. 7, 2005); Application Instituting Proceedings Submitted by the Govern-
ment of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG v. U.S.) (Mar. 2, 1999) at
httpJ/www.icj-cij.org (last visited Aug. 7, 2005); Application Instituting Proceed-
ings Submitted by the Government of Mexico, (Mex. v. U.S.), (Jan. 9, 2003) at
http'//www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocketimus/imusorder/imusjiapplication_20030109.PDF (last
visited Aug. 7, 2005).
49. See Application Instituting Proceedings Submitted by the Government
of Mexico, (Mex. v. U.S.), (Jan. 9, 2003) at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusorder/imusjiapplication20030109.PDF (last
visited Aug. 7, 2005); Application Instituting Proceedings Submitted by the
Government of Paraguay (Para. v. U.S.) (Apr. 3, 1998) at http'//www.icj-cij.org
(last visited Aug. 7, 2005); Application Instituting Proceedings Submitted by the
Government of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG v. U.S.) (Mar. 2, 1999) at
http://www.icj-cij.org (last visited Aug. 7, 2005). Other violations include: fail-
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enna Convention on Consular Relations ("Paraguay Case");
The LaGrand Case ("La Grand");5 and Avena 2 are the three
ICJ cases that parallel the U.S. domestic case law in which
Vienna Convention violations have been raised, some of
which include Breard v. Greene;53 LaGrand v. Arizona;54 Tor-
res v. Mullin; and Medellin v. Dretke.5'
1. Breard v. Greene and Paraguay Case
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Breard, established that the
procedural default doctrine is applicable to claims of Vienna
Convention violations." Breard concerns Paraguayan na-
tional Angel Francisco Breard who was sentenced to death for
attempted rape and capital murder.58 The conviction and sen-
tence were affirmed by the Supreme Court of Virginia59 and
the U.S. Supreme Court denied the writ for a petition of cer-
tiorari to review the conviction.0
Following all conviction appeals, Breard filed a motion
for habeas relief,"' contending that because his Vienna Con-
vention rights were violated-law enforcement failed to in-
form him of his right to consular assistance upon his arrest-
ure to inform consular authorities about the detention of their nationals and
denial to the consular authorities of the right for them to provide counsel for
their nationals. See Application Instituting Proceedings Submitted by the Gov-
ernment of Mexico, (Mex. v. U.S.), (Jan. 9, 2003) at http'//www.icj-
cij.orgicjwww/idocket/imus/imusorder/imusiapplication_20030109.PDF (last
visited Aug. 7, 2005); Application Instituting Proceedings Submitted by the
Government of Paraguay (Para. v. U.S.) (Apr. 3, 1998) at httpj/www.icj-cij.org
(last visited Aug. 7, 2005); Application Instituting Proceedings Submitted by the
Government of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG v. U.S.) (Mar. 2, 1999) at
http://www.icj-cij.org (last visited Aug. 7, 2005).
50. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J.
246 (Apr. 9) available at http://www.icj-cij.org (last visited Aug. 7, 2005), dis-
missed 1999 I.C.J. 221 (Nov. 10, 1998) available at http'//www.icj-cij.org (last
visited Aug. 7, 2005).
51. LaGrand (FRG v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27) at http://www.icj-
cij.org (last visited Aug. 7, 2005).
52. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.),
2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31) at http'//www.icj-cij.org (last visited Aug. 7, 2005).
53. 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
54. 526 U.S. 1001 (1999).
55. 540 U.S. 1035 (2003).
56. 371 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004).
57. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 375-77.
58. See id. at 372-73.
59. See id. at 373.
60. Id.
61. See id.
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the conviction and sentence should be overturned.62 The Fed-
eral District Court denied relief, holding that Breard proce-
durally defaulted by not raising the violation in state court.6
The Fourth Circuit affirmed."
Breard petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for an original
writ of habeas corpus and for a stay application, again claim-
ing Vienna Convention violations." The Court upheld the
lower courts' decisions that Breard procedurally defaulted
and it denied the petition," thereby establishing the applica-
bility of the procedural default doctrine to ban a habeas cor-
pus review when the alleged Convention violation is pre-
sented for the first time in federal court, after state appeals
had been exhausted.
Before Breard applied for the writ of certiorari to the U.S.
Supreme Court, the Republic of Paraguay initiated proceed-
ings with the ICJ against the United States.68 The claim al-
leged that the United States failed to notify Breard of his
right to consular assistance upon his arrest.69 Six days after
the case was filed, the ICJ ordered that provisional measures
be taken by the United States to ensure a stay of Breard's
execution until a final decision by the ICJ.70 After the provi-
sional measures order and before oral arguments in the ICJ
62. See id. at 373-74.
63. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 374. Even if there had been no procedural de-
fault, the District Court ruled that "Breard could not demonstrate cause and
prejudice for this default," the requirement to procedural default rule exception.
Id. at 373.
64. See id. at 374.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 375.
67. See id. at 373.
68. See Application Instituting Proceedings Submitted by the Government
of Paraguay (Para. v. U.S.) (Apr. 3, 1998) at http://www.icj-cij.org (last visited
Aug. 7, 2005).
69. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 374; Application Instituting Proceedings Sub-
mitted by the Government of Paraguay (Para. v. U.S.) (Apr. 3, 1998) at
http://www.icj-cij.org (last visited Aug. 7, 2005).
70. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1998 I.C.J. 246. The
Court unanimously ruled that-"[t]he United States should take all measures at
its disposal to ensure that Angel Francisco Breard is not executed pending the
final decision in these proceedings, and should inform the Court of all the
measures which it has taken in implementation of this Order." Id. at 258. Arti-
cle 41 of the ICJ Statute gives the ICJ the authority to issue such provisional
measures. Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 41, available at
http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm#CHAPTERIII
(last visited Aug. 7, 2005).
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case began, the U.S. Supreme Court denied Breard's applica-
tion for a writ.7 Then, on April 14, 1998, before the ICJ could
render a decision and in violation of the ICJ provisional
measures, the Commonwealth of Virginia executed Breard.72
Following a U.S. apology for the Vienna Convention vio-
lation,73 Paraguay requested a discontinuance of the case,
which was granted by the ICJ.74 Since the case was dis-
missed, the ICJ was unable to address whether the United
States' application of the procedural default rule that bans
review and reconsideration of Vienna Convention violations is
valid. Additionally, because the case was dismissed, the
United States' defiance of the provisional measures order was
not brought to the ICJ.
2. LaGrand v. Arizona and Federal Republic of
Germany v. United States ('LaGrand")
German nationals Walter and Karl LaGrand were con-
victed and sentenced to death for armed robbery resulting in
death.75  Only after their convictions did they discover,
through sources other than law enforcement, their right to
consular assistance. 6 After contacting the German consulate,
the brothers appealed their sentences and convictions based
on the failure of the detaining officials to inform them of their
rights under the Vienna Convention, which they claimed re-
sulted in a weaker defense than if they would have received
assistance from the German consulate. U.S. federal courts
again applied the procedural default doctrine and rejected
their appeals.78
Karl LaGrand, who was scheduled to be executed first,
71. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 378.
72. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE EXECUTION OF ANGEL BREARD:
APOLOGIES ARE NOT ENOUGH, May 1, 1998, at
httpj/web.amnesty.orglibrary/Index/engAMR510271998 (last visited Aug. 7,
2005).
73. See William J. Aceves, Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Con-
sular Relations (Federal Republic of Germany v. United States), 93 AM. J. INT'L
L. 924, 927 (1999).
74. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1998 I.C.J. 246.
75. See WIKIPEDIA: THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, LAGRAND CASE, at
http'//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LaGrand-case (last modified May 2, 2003).
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
947
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was executed in February 1999."9 Only hours before Walter's
scheduled execution date, the Federal Republic of Germany
("FRG") filed the second Vienna Convention case with the ICJ
against the United States on Walter's behalf.8 A request for
provisional measures to stay the execution of Walter LaGrand
accompanied FRG's claim; the ICJ unanimously granted this
request.81
FRG attempted to enforce the ICJ's stay of execution, but
the U.S. government did not agree with the ICJ's issuance of
provisional measures. After the measures were granted, the
FRG and LaGrand filed applications with the U.S. Supreme
Court.8" The first application, filed by FRG, requested a tem-
porary restraining order or preliminary injunction against the
United States and the governor of the State of Arizona to not
execute LaGrand." The Court denied this application, ruling
that in the claim against Arizona the Court did not have ju-
risdiction because of the Eleventh Amendment's prohibition
on federal courts from hearing lawsuits against a U.S. state
when filed by a foreign state.8 With regard to the claim
against the United States, the Court ruled that the United
States had not given up its sovereign immunity and that Ar-
ticle III, section 2, clause 2 did not conclusively allow for an
action to prevent the execution of an individual who is neither
an ambassador nor counsel.8 Thus, the FRG exhausted its
options. Simultaneously, LaGrand filed an application
against Arizona for a stay of execution and for a writ of cer-
79. See id.
80. See Application Instituting Proceedings Submitted by the Government
of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG v. U.S.) (Mar. 2, 1999) at
http://www.icj-cij.org (last visited Aug. 7, 2005).
81. See LaGrand (FRG v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 9, 16 (June 27). The ICJ unani-
mously indicated the following provisional measures:
(a) The United States of America should take all measures at its dis-
posal to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not executed pending the final
decision in these proceedings, and should inform the Court of all the
measures which it has taken in implementation of this Order;
(b) The Government of the United States of America should transmit
this Order to the Governor of the State of Arizona.
Id.
82. See Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111 (1999);
LaGrand v. Arizona, 526 U.S. 1001 (1999).
83. See Federal Republic of Germany, 526 U.S. at 111.
84. See id. at 112; see also WIKIPEDIA, supra note 75.
85. See Federal Republic of Germany, 526 U.S. at 112.
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tiorari, but this was also denied.86
The U.S. Supreme Court was not the only government
entity that refused to acknowledge the validity of provisional
measures issued by the ICJ. The U.S. Solicitor-General, in
response to the ICJ's order, informed the Court that the ICJ's
ruling was not legally binding,17 and the U.S. Department of
State notified the governor of Arizona of the provisional
measures, but did not provide any comment on them.88 The
Arizona clemency board, however, recommended a stay of
LaGrand's execution pending a resolution of the ICJ case, but
this recommendation was disregarded and Walter LaGrand
was executed.89 After LaGrand's execution, Germany ad-
justed its complaint with the ICJ by adding the claim of U.S.
non-observance of the provisional order. °
Unlike in Paraguay Case, LaGrand was fully adjudicated
and resulted in an important ICJ ruling. On June 27, 2001,
the ICJ held: (1) the ICJ had jurisdiction to hear the case
based on Article 1 of the Optional Protocol;8 ' (2) the United
States breached LaGrand's Vienna Convention rights; 2 (3)
the United States breached its obligation to abide by the pro-
visional measures, therefore, declaring the ICJ provisional
measures binding;93 and (4) the United States' application of
the procedural default doctrine, which barred review and re-
consideration of LaGrand's claim, was a violation of Article
36, paragraph two of the Vienna Convention.94
86. See LaGrand, 526 U.S. at 1001.
87. See WIKIPEDIA, supra note 75.
88. Id.
89. Id. Walter LaGrand was executed on on March 3, 1999. Id.
90. See Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG v. U.S.) (Sept.
16, 1999) at httpJ/www.icj-cij.org (last visited Aug. 7, 2005).
91. See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 514.
92. Id. at 515.
93. Id. at 516. The vote was thirteen to two. The judges ruling in favor of
this holding were President Guilaume, Vice-President Shi, and Judges Bed-
jaoui, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Kooi-
jmans, Rezek, A1-Khasawneh, and Buergenthal. The judges ruling against this
holding were Judges Oda and Parra-Aranguren. Id.
94. Id. The judges ruling in favor of this holding were President Guilaume,
Vice-President Shi, and Judges Bedjaoui, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer,
Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Kooijmans, Rezek, AI-Khasawneh, Buergen-
thal, and Parra-Aranguren. The only judge ruling against this holding was
Judge Oda. Id.
[T]he I.C.J. ruling conclusively determine[d] that Article 36 of the Vi-
enna Convention creates individually enforceable rights, resolving the
question most American courts... have left open... . It also suggests
949
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Although the ICJ found that the procedural default doc-
trine, as applied, frustrated the purpose of Article 36," and
therefore was a violation of the Vienna Convention, it did not
find the doctrine inherently contradictory to the Convention.
Instead, the Court stated that the violation "was caused by
the circumstances in which the procedural default rule was
applied, and not by the rule as such."96 In essence, the appli-
cation of the procedural default doctrine may be permissibly
applied to Vienna Convention cases as long as it does not pre-
vent the full effect of the purpose of the treaty.97 Since the
procedural default doctrine as applied by the United States
was not giving full effect to the Article, the ICJ required the
United States, through a method of its own selection, to im-
plement measures to ensure that the rights of foreign nation-
als are protected and that review and reconsideration of con-
victions and sentences takes into account alleged Vienna
Convention violations.98 Since the ICJ does not operate under
the principles of stare decisis,99 LaGrand is only applicable to
that courts cannot rely upon procedural default rules to circumvent a
review of Vienna Convention claims on the merits.
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law: U.S.
Implementation of ICJ's LaGrand Decision, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 180, 181 (Sean D.
Murphy ed., 2003) (2003).
95. The purpose of Article 36 is frustrated if a process does not allow the
detained individual to challenge a conviction and sentence by claiming,
in reliance on Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Convention, that the com-
petent national authorities failed to comply with their obligation to
provide the requisite consular information 'without delay', thus pre-
venting the person from seeking and obtaining consular assistance
from the sending State.
Press Release, International Court of Justice, LaGrand Case (Germany v.
United States of America): Summary of the Judgment of 27 June 2001 (June 27,
2001), at http://www.icj-cij.org (last visited Aug. 7, 2005).
96. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 513.
97. See Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 36(2).
98. See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 516. The judges ruling in favor of this hold-
ing were President Guilaume, Vice-President Shi, and Judges Bedjaoui, Ran-
jeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Kooijmans,
Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal and Parra-Aranguren. The only judge rul-
ing against this holding was Judge Oda. See id. The specific language of the
ruling is as follows:
In the case of such a conviction and sentence, it would be incumbent
upon the United States to allow the review and reconsideration of the
conviction and sentence by taking account of the violation of the rights
set forth in the Convention. This obligation can be carried out in vari-
ous ways. The choice of means must be left to the United States.
Id. at 514.
99. Stare decisis is a "doctrine of precedent" in which a court must follow its
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the specific facts of that case and not transferable to any
other alleged cases of Vienna Convention violations.'00
3. Torres v. Mullin and Mexico's Petition to the ICJ in
Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals ("Avena")
Osvaldo Torres is a Mexican national convicted of murder
and sentenced to death.'0 ' After Torres exhausted his post-
conviction remedies, he petitioned for habeas corpus relief in
federal court.' The Federal District Court applied the proce-
dural default doctrine to deny Torres's writ for a COA be-
cause Torres did not raise his Vienna Convention claim in
state court."°3 The court also found that even if there was no
procedural default, Torres did not show that he had been
prejudiced, as required to remove the bar to an evidentiary
hearing.04 The Tenth Circuit affirmed this decision.0 5
Torres next petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ
of certiorari, 6 requesting that the Court review the case in
light of the conflict between the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling
in Breard and the ICJ's ruling in LaGrand.°7 As discussed
above, Breard held that the procedural default doctrine is ap-
plicable in Vienna Convention cases, and LaGrand stated
that the United States' process of review and reconsideration
earlier judicial decision when the same issues again are presented to the court.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1143 (8th ed. 2004). The ICJ Statute states that
.[t]he decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and
in respect of that particular case." Statute of the International Court of Justice,
Article 59, http'//www.icj-
cij.orgicjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictextibasicstatute.htm#CHAPTER-III
(last visited Aug. 7, 2005).
100. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 59,
http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictextibasicstatute.htm#CHAPTER-III
(last visited Aug. 7, 2005). Therefore, future cases brought against the United
States claiming that the procedural default doctrine as applied violated a for-
eign national's Convention rights will not be automatically decided in the peti-
tioner's favor. The ICJ must again look at the facts and issue presented and
make a new decision.
101. See Torres v. United States, 540 U.S. 1035, 1037 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing).
102. Id. at 1037-38.
103. Id. at 1038.
104. Id.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See Torres, 540 U.S. at 1038 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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was insufficient when the procedural default doctrine did not
give the petitioner full opportunity to have his Vienna Con-
vention claims heard. °8 Torres's petition gave the Court the
opportunity to reconcile this conflict.
Before the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the petition for a
writ of certiorari, Mexico filed the latest of the Vienna Con-
vention ICJ cases, Avena, against the United States for al-
leged violations of Article 36 of the Convention.' The allega-
tions concerned the rights of fifty-four Mexican nationals,
which included Torres and another U.S. Supreme Court peti-
tioner, Medellin." ° Mexico submitted a request to the U.S.
Supreme Court asking the Court to defer its decision on
whether to grant certiorari in Torres's case until the ICJ had
ruled on the ICJ case."' However, before oral arguments be-
gan at the ICJ, the U.S. Supreme Court denied Torres's ap-
plication for a writ of certiorari." '
Justice Breyer strongly dissented in the denial of certio-
rari."' Breyer's argument, like Mexico's, was that the deci-
sion to grant or deny certiorari should be made only after the
ICJ ruled in the case."' Additionally, before deciding to deny
certiorari, Breyer wanted further briefing on the precise in-
ternational legal issues of the case."'
Despite the denial of certiorari, the case before the ICJ
continued. Mexico's petition included a request for provi-
sional measures to stay the executions of all the Mexican na-
tionals represented in the claim; the ICJ, however, only
granted measures with respect to the three Mexican nationals
108. Breard, 523 U.S. at 375-77; LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 466.
109. See Application Instituting Proceedings Submitted by the Government
of Mexico, (Mex. v. U.S.), (Jan. 9, 2003) at http'J/www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusorder/imus-iapplication_20030109.PDF (last
visited Aug. 7, 2005).
110. See id.; Press Release, International Court of Justice, Mexico Brings a
Case Against the Unites States of America and Requests the Indication of Pro-
visional Measures (Jan. 10, 2003), at http://www.ICJ-
cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ipress2003/ipresscom2003-01_20030110.htm (last vis-
ited Aug. 7, 2005). The number of Mexican nationals was later dropped to fifty-
two after the State of Illinois pardoned all death row prisoners. See id.
111. Torres, 540 U.S. at 1038 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112. See id.
113. See id. at 1037 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
114. See id. at 1041 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer wanted to wait
for an ICJ decision, because depending on how the ICJ ruled on the case, he
might have decided to grant certiorari. Id.
115. See id.
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that faced execution in the imminent future, including Tor-
res."' Unlike Breard and LaGrand, none of the three pro-
tected nationals, or any of the nationals listed in the Avena
case, were executed pending the ICJ's decision. Oklahoma
agreed to a temporary stay of execution for the protected for-
eign national on its death row, Torres."7 Texas, however, an-
nounced that it would execute the protected nationals on its
death row at the appropriate time, despite the provisional
measures."8 Thus, the two Mexican nationals on death row in
Texas, Fierro and Moreno, survived only because it was not
the appropriate execution time, and not because Texas be-
lieved the measures to be binding or subject to comity to the
ICJ. In briefs written in opposition to other Vienna Conven-
tion cases, the federal government also expressly denied the
authority of the ICJ to issue binding measures on member
parties."9 In these opposition briefs, the United States ar-
gued that "the ICJ does not exercise any judicial power of the
United States, which is vested exclusively by the Constitution
of the United States federal courts." 2° The United States' ex-
pressed concern was with "interfere [ing] with [the states']
116. See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v.
U.S.), Order, Request For the Indication of Provisional Measures, Feb. 5, 2003,
42 I.L.M. 309 at httpJ/www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusorder/imusiorder_20030205.PDF, 59 (last
visited Aug. 7, 2005). The Court, in a unanimous decision,
[i]ndicate[d] the following provisional measures: (a) The United States
of America shall take all measures necessary to ensure that Mr. Cesar
Roberto Fierro Reyna, Mr. Roberto Moreno Ramos and Mr. Osvaldo
Torres Aguilera are not executed pending final judgment in these pro-
ceedings; (b) The Government of the United States of America shall in-
form the Court of all measures taken in implementation of this Order.
Id.
117. INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE PROJECT, OKLAHOMA DELAYS DECISION ON
WORLD COURT STAY, at
http://www.internationalj usticeproject.org/briefsWorldNews.cfm#oklaWorld
(last visited Aug. 7, 2005).
118. See C. Bryson Hull, Texas Snubs World Court on Execution Stays,
REUTERS, Feb. 6, 2004, http'J/www.cjcj.org/press/texassnubs.html (last visited
Aug. 7, 2005).
119. See Torres, 540 U.S. at 1041 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Opposition briefs
were filed in two Vienna Convention cases, Ortiz v. United States, No. 02-11188
and Sinesterra v. United States, No. 03-5286.
120. Justice Breyer, in his dissenting opinion in Torres, noted that this
statement fails to look at the possible authority granted to the ICJ by the
United States by the ratification of the Optional Protocol. See Torres, 540 U.S.
at 1041 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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sovereign right to administer.., criminal justice system."12'
The Avena case continued to a resolution.
D. Recent Developments
1. ICJ's Holding in Avena
In March 2004, the ICJ, for the second time, ruled
against the United States, finding that it violated its obliga-
tions under the Vienna Convention with respect to the fifty-
one Mexican nationals referred to in Avena by not informing
them of their right to consular assistance, among other viola-
tions. 2 2 The appropriate reparation for these violations re-
quires the United States, by means of its own choosing, to re-
view and reconsider the convictions and sentences of the
Mexican nationals named in Avena, 2' and ascertain whether
the Article 36 violation actually prejudiced the defendant in
the criminal justice proceedings. 1 4 According to the ICJ, an
adequate review and reconsideration process must guarantee
121. See Hull, supra note 118.
122. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, 2004 I.C.J. 128, T
153(4). In a vote of fourteen to one, the ICJ found
that, by not informing, without delay upon their detention, the 51
Mexican nationals referred to in paragraph 106(1) above of their rights
under Article 36, paragraph 1(b), of the Vienna Convention on Consu-
lar Relations of 24 April 1963, the United States of American breached
the obligation incumbent upon it under that sub-paragraph.
Id.
For other violations, see id. at 153(5)-(8). In another vote of fourteen to one,
the court held that
by not notifying the appropriate Mexican consular post without delay of
the detention of the 49 Mexican nationals referred in paragraph 106(2)
above and thereby depriving the United Mexican States of the right, in
a timely fashion, to render the assistance provided for by the Vienna
Convention to the individuals concerned, the United States of Ameri-
can breached the obligation incumbent upon it under Article 36, para-
graph 1 (b).
Id. at 153(5). The ICJ also
[found) that, by not permitting the review and reconsideration, in the
light of the rights set forth in the Convention, of the conviction and
sentences of Mr. Cesar Roberto Fierro Reyna, Mr. Roberto Moreno
Ramos and Mr. Osvaldo Torres Aguilera, after the violations referred
to in subparagraph (4) above had been established in respect of those
individuals, the United States of America breached the obligation in-
cumbent upon it under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Convention.
Id. at 153(8).
123. Id. at 153(9).
124. Id. at T 121.
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that the violation and any resulting prejudice be fully exam-
ined and considered 12 and that full weight be given to the Vi-
enna Convention violations regardless of the actual outcome
of such review and reconsideration, because the treaty rights
should be undertaken "irrespective of the due process rights
under the United States constitutional law."12  The ICJ
stated that the U.S. judicial process is a suitable mechanism
to provide the required review and reconsideration, 27 but it
specified that the procedure should occur within the greater
judicial proceedings and not only at the clemency stage.128
The United States had claimed that the clemency process
was its selected means of review and reconsideration; how-
ever, in Avena, the ICJ found that as practiced, the clemency
process did not appear to guarantee full examination and
consideration of Vienna Convention violations, and therefore,
is an insufficient and inappropriate means of review and re-
consideration.29  The ICJ found that clemency procedures, if
appropriate, could supplement judicial review and reconsid-
eration in circumstances where the judicial system failed to
address the violation of claimant's rights under the Vienna
Convention.' The Avena holding was very similar to the
LaGrand holding, but the impact of Avena was greater, be-
cause it sparked a series of U.S. government reactions.
2. Oklahoma Grants Torres Clemency after the Avena
Holding
Despite being denied certiorari before the U.S. Supreme
Court on his habeas petition, Osvaldo Torres was granted
125. Id. at T 138.
126. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.),
2004 I.C.J. 128, T 153(9) (Mar. 31) at httpJ/www.icj-cij.org (last visited Aug. 7,
2005) (for the language stating the requirements); see also id. at 9 139 (for the
requirement that full weight be given to the violation). The U.S. amicus brief
fails to mention this paragraph, although it mentions others more advantageous
to its position. See Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Respondent of the United
States, Medellin v. Dretke, No. 04-5928, On Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (U.S. filed Feb, 28, 2005). It ap-
pears that the United States is unwilling to agree with such a statement, even if
it does cite the paragraph that requires the review and reconsideration process
to take this paragraph into account.
127. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, 2004 I.C.J. 128,
140.
128. See id. at 91 141.
129. Id. at $ 143.
130. Id.
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clemency by Oklahoma Governor Brad Henry."' Oklahoma
agreed to honor the ICJ's stay of Torres's execution pending a
decision in the Avena case, 132 and less than two months after
that decision, Governor Henry commuted Torres's death sen-
tence to life in prison without the possibility of parole.' The
clemency was granted days after the Oklahoma Pardon and
Parole Board voted to recommend clemency for Torres and
hours after the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals ordered
an indefinite stay of Torres's execution and an evidentiary
hearing,' responding to a concern for a possible "miscarriage
of justice."'35
3. Fifth Circuit Refuses to Adopt the Avena Decision in
Medellin v. Dretke
a. History
Jose Ernesto Medellin is a Mexican foreign national con-
victed and sentenced to death for the rape and murder of two
teenage girls.'36 On direct appeal, the Texas Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals affirmed-his conviction and sentence. 131 Medellin
did not petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme
131. EUROPEAN UNION DELEGATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TO THE USA,
EU POLICY ON THE DEATH PENALTY, May 13, 2004, at
http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/DeathPenaltyfrorresVOklaGovMess.htm (last
visited Aug. 7, 2005); DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, OKLAHOMA
GOVERNOR GRANTS CLEMENCY TO MEXICAN FOREIGN NATIONAL, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.orglarticle.php?did=996&scid=64 (last visited May
18, 2005).
132. INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 117.
133. Id.
134. Id.; Torres v. State of Oklahoma, PCD-2004-442 (Court of Criminal Ap-
peals of the State of Oklahoma) May 13, 2004, available at
httpJ/www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/getcaseinformation.asp?submitted=true&
number=PCD-2004-442&db=Appellate&viewtype=caseGeneral (last visited May
18, 2005). On the evidentiary hearing, the district court found that Torres had
been prejudiced by the Vienna Convention violation. Torres v. The State of
Oklahoma, PCD-2004-442, District Court of Oklahoma County, Mar. 18, 2005.
135. DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, supra note 127. In granting the
stay of execution, Judge Chapel wrote, "I have concluded that there is a possibil-
ity a significant miscarriage ofjustice occurred, as shown by Torres' claims, spe-
cifically that the violation of his Vienna Convention rights contributed to trial
counsel's ineffectiveness, that the jury did not hear significant evidence, and the
results of the trial is unreliable." Id.
136. Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 273-74 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. granted,
125 S. Ct. 686 (2004).
137. Id. at 274.
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Court."8 He did, however, petition for a writ of habeas cor-
pus, but the state trial court recommended that the applica-
tion be denied.'39 Only days after the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals granted a temporary stay of Torres's execu-
tion and Oklahoma Governor Henry granted Torres clemency
based on the treaty rights raised by the petition, the Fifth
Circuit followed the state level recommendation, interpreting
the correct course of action to be different from that which
Oklahoma pursued. 40 The Fifth Circuit denied Medellin's pe-
tition for a COA.''
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged the ICJ's decisions in
LaGrand and Avena, but ultimately decided that even though
those cases contradict Breard, "[they, the Fifth Circuit] may
not disregard the Supreme Court's clear holding that ordi-
nary procedural default rules can bar Vienna Convention
Claims."' Essentially, the Fifth Circuit left the issue for the
U.S. Supreme Court to decide, inviting Medellin to petition
for a writ of certiorari on this issue. The Fifth Circuit also
held that even if the claim was not procedurally defaulted,
the Vienna Convention creates no personal rights for which
the petitioner can rely upon for a remedy, disregarding the
ICJ's determination in LaGrand and Avena that these are in-
dividually enforceable rights." The court based this deter-
mination on the fact that a prior panel of that court had al-
ready determined that there were no individually enforceable
rights;1" thus, only if the court sits en banc or the Supreme
Court rules otherwise could this decision be overturned.
145
The Fifth Circuit's denial of a COA for Medellin demon-
strated a division among lower courts in how to apply the ICJ
decision. Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals granted an
evidentiary hearing and an indefinite stay of execution in
Torres's case, respecting the ICJ decision, and the Texas state
court and the Fifth Circuit continued to follow domestic law
and not the lCJ decision. After the denial of a COA, Medellin
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 280.
141. Id. at 274.
142. Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 280 (5th Cir. 2004).
143. Id.
144. United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 198 (5th Cir. 2001).
145. Medellin, 371 F.3d at 280.
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petitioned for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court.46
This petition was granted and oral arguments were heard on
March 28, 2005.14 Medellin sought to enforce his right, under
the Vienna Convention and the ICJ decision in Avena, to have
the court review and reconsider his conviction and death sen-
tence, without the application of the procedural default doc-
trine as imposed by Texas law.'48 The issues as presented by
the petitioner are: (1) whether a U.S. domestic court must ap-
ply the ICJ's Avena ruling, which held that U.S. courts must
review and reconsider the foreign national's conviction and
sentence, taking into account the violation of his Vienna Con-
vention rights and without resorting to procedural default
doctrines;" and (2) alternatively, whether, in a case pre-
sented to the court by a foreign national of a Vienna Conven-
tion signatory state, a U.S. court should follow the Avena and
LaGrand judgments as a matter of judicial comity and in the
interest of uniform treaty interpretation. 5 °
b. Amici Briefs in Medellin
As of January 2005, fifty-nine nations and approximately
seventy-five organizations and prominent individuals had
signed amici briefs supporting the petitioner, Medellin, in his
case before the U.S. Supreme Court.15 One brief supporting
the respondent, Texas, was from the Washington Legal
Foundation,5 2 which argued for the Court not to "invoke in-
146. Response to Petitioner's Motion to Stay, at 1, Medellin v. Dretke, No. 04-
5928, On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit (U.S. filed Mar. 15, 2005).
147. Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004). For a transcript of the oral
arguments, see Medellin v. Dretke, No. 04-5928, at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument transcripts/04-
5928.pdf (last visited Aug. 7, 2005). On May 23, 2005, the Court dismissed the
writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2088,
2089 (2005).
148. Response to Petitioner's Motion to Stay, at 1-2, Medellin (No. 04-5928).
149. Id. at i.
150. Id.
151. DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, MARK WARREN, FOREIGN
NATIONALS: CURRENT ISSUES AND NEWS: U.S. SUPREME COURT AGREES TO
HEAR CONSULAR RIGHTS CASE, at
http'//www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=31&did=579 (last visited Aug.
7, 2005). For a listing of amici briefs filed in the case, see also, U.S. Supreme
Court Docket, (Medellin v. Dretke, No. 04-5928) at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/04-5928.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2005).
152. U.S. Supreme Court Docket, (Medellin v. Dretke, No. 04-5928) at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/04-5928.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2005).
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ternational law as a basis for overturning [Medellin's] convic-
tion,"53 because international law should not trump U.S. do-
mestic laws. The United States shared this view in its
amicus brief in support of Texas.'
In its amicus brief, the United States contended that the
Court should not hear the case, but it argued that if the Court
did hear the case, it should dismiss the petitioner's claims. 5'
As noted earlier, the petitioner asked the Court to hold that
the Avena decision is the result of a binding treaty obligation,
giving him a judicially enforceable right to review and recon-
sideration of his conviction and sentence. Alternatively,
Medellin asks the Court to enforce the Avena decision as a
matter of comity."' In response to the petitioner's claims, the
United States reasoned that they do not entitle him to relief 57
because: (1) the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals correctly de-
nied the petition for a certificate of appealability;'58 (2) under
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, there is no basis for the
petitioner to challenge his conviction or sentence;"' (3) the
Avena decision cannot be privately enforced;6 ' and (4) the
President determined that, with respect to the fifty-one indi-
viduals referred to in Avena, the Avena decision should be en-
forced in state courts as a matter of comity."' The first three
arguments by the United States were shared by Texas, the
respondent, 6 ' but the United States' fourth argument was
unique.
The amicus brief stated that "the [p]resident is 'the sole
153. Press Release, Washington Legal Foundation, Court Urged Not to Allow
International Law to Trump U.S. Criminal Laws (Medellin v. Dretke, No. 04-
5928), Mar. 2, 2005, http://wlf.orgupload/030205RS.pdf (last visited Aug. 7,
2005).
154. See U.S. Supreme Court Docket, (Medellin v. Dretke, No. 04-5928) at
httpJ/www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/04-5928.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2005);
Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Respondent of the United States, at 10-11,
Medellin v. Dretke, No. 04-5928, On Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (U.S. filed Feb, 28, 2005).
155. Amici Curiae Brief, at 10-11, Medellin (No. 04-5928).
156. Respondent's Brief, at 4-7, Medellin v. Dretke, No. 04-5928, On Writ of
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (U.S. filed
Feb, 28, 2005).
157. Amici Curiae Brief, at 12, Medellin (No. 04-5928).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 23.
160. Id. at 41.
161. Id. at 48.
162. Id. at 10.
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organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations""6 and that in his role as the president, he "enjoys 'a
degree of independent authority to act' in 'foreign affairs.""'
The argument further explained that the president has dis-
cretion whether to comply with an ICJ decision, and, in this
case, the U.S. foreign policy interests justify such compli-
ance. 65 Once the President determined that it was in the best
interest of the United States to comply with the ICJ decision,
it was necessary to determine whether the executive branch
should seek legislation to effect this determination or whether
to unilaterally act. 6' Given the "paramount interest" in
"prompt compliance," the Executive pursued unilateral action
and issued a presidential order.'67
c. Presidential Order
On February 28, 2005, President George W. Bush signed
an order declaring,
I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in me
as president by the Constitution and laws of the United
States, that the United States discharge its international
obligations under the decision of the International Court
of Justice in the Case Concerning Avena and other Mexi-
can Nationals... by having state courts give effect to the
decision in accordance with general principles of comity in
cases filed by the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in that
decision. 161
The executive branch interpreted the Avena decision such
that the United States must provide a means of review and
163. Amici Curiae Brief, at 50, Medellin (No. 04-5928).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 51. The foreign policy interest in this case is the security of the
United States' own citizens abroad. The lawyers for President Bush recognized
that consular assistance is "a vital safeguard for Americans abroad," and thus,
the United States must fulfill its own obligations in order to ensure this protec-
tion for its own citizens. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 51-52. The President exercised his power according to his author-
ity under Article 94 of the U.N. Charter, which allows the president to establish
a binding federal rule without utilizing the legislative process. Id. at 52-53.
168. Id. at 52 (internal citation omitted). See also, Staff Writer, Bush Orders
Hearings for Mexicans on Death Row: The action, Triggered by a World Court
Ruling, May Pit the President against State Officials, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2005,
at A21, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-
death9mar09,1,6145815.story?ctrack=3&cset=true [hereinafter Bush Orders
Hearings].
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reconsideration of the convictions and sentences of the fifty-
one Mexican nationals, referred to in Avena, to determine
whether the Vienna Convention violations actually prejudiced
the defendants at trail or at sentencing.16 This Order was is-
sued under general principles of comity and not out of a sense
of obligation.17 ° In the brief, President Bush's lawyers also
argued that the Order is supreme over state laws and thus,
state procedural default rules that would prevent full effect of
this Order are preempted.'71 Although the United States filed
this brief on behalf of Texas, Texas disputes the validity of
the order recited in the brief. 172 The Texas Attorney General
stated that "[they] believe the executive determination... ex-
ceeds the constitutional bounds for federal authority."
173
d. Motion to Stay Proceedings
The Presidential Order affords Medellin the right to re-
view and reconsideration of his claim at the state court level
in Texas. Consequently, a little less than three weeks before
the U.S. Supreme Court was to hear the case, Medellin moved
for a stay of the hearing before the Court 74 while he pursued
169. Id. at 49-50; see Amici Curiae Brief, at 50, Medellin (No. 04-5928); see
also Bush Orders Hearings, supra note 164. An issue beyond the scope of this
comment is what the state court review will entail. The burden is likely on the
defendant, but the level of burden is unknown. The courts might analyze the
prejudice similarly to that of an ineffectiveness of counsel claim. If that is so, it
is highly improbable that any petitioner will be able to show actual prejudice.
In contrast, however, after the Oklahoma Court of Criminals remanded the Tor-
res case for a hearing, the district court of Oklahoma found that Torres was
prejudiced through the application of a three-prong test stated in a special con-
curring opinion by the Okalahoma Court of Criminal Appeals: "(1) the defen-
dant did not know he had a right to contact his consulate for assistance; (2) he
would have availed himself of that right had he known of it; and (3) it was likely
that the consulate would have assisted the defendant." Torres v. The State of
Oklahoma, PCD-2004-442, District Court of Oklahoma County, Mar. 18, 2005.
Whether this standard would be the same standard applied by state courts on
review and reconsideration is an option, but this discussion is also beyond the
scope of this comment.
170. Amici Curiae Brief, at 52, Medellin (No. 04-5928). As mentioned before,
comity is a type of judicial grace. The President is following the ICJ decision,
not out of an obligation, but instead, out of grace.
171. Id. at 54.
172. See id. at 50. This comment will not explore the constitutional issues of
the Executive Branch's exercise of authority in the issuance of the order.
173. See id.
174. Motion to Stay, at 1, Medellin v. Dretke, No. 04-5928, On Writ of Certio-
rari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (U.S. filed Feb,
28, 2005).
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his remedies before the Texas court.175 Texas responded to
this motion with three reasons why the Court should continue
to hear this case: (1) the issue before the Court is whether the
Fifth Circuit properly denied the COA, and this issue is unre-
lated to any state habeas proceeding that Medellin might
seek; (2) Petitioner's motion to stay is based on "a not-yet-
filed successive state habeas application"176 that the Petitioner
plans to file based on the President's Order; however, the va-
lidity of that Presidential Order is not before the Court, and
again, this is not the issue before the Court; and (3) even if
the Petitioner pursues his claim in state court, the result of
such a hearing does not affect the federal question before the
Court.'77 In summary, the argument is that it is irrelevant
whether the Petitioner is granted his remedy of "review and
reconsideration" because the issue before the court is whether
the COA was properly denied at the Fifth Circuit.17 The
Court took no action on the Petitioner's request for a stay,
and the Court heard oral arguments anyway.'79 During ar-
guments, several Justices questioned the necessity of hearing
the case now that the Petitioner was granted his remedy of
review and reconsideration in state court.8 ' Dismissal of the
writ as improvidently granted would allow the Court to avoid
deciding very difficult issues of law, and the Court took this
course of action on May 23, 2005, in a 5-4 decision to dismiss
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Absence of action by the Court is sufficient evidence that the request for
a stay was denied. Additionally, the Court heard the case on March 28, 2005.
180. For a transcript of the oral arguments, see Medellin v. Dretke, No. 04-
5928, at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument transcripts/04-
5928.pdf (last visited Aug. 7, 2005). Justice Stevens questioned whether the
Texas proceeding, now required by the President's order, would make the issue
before the Court moot, and eliminating the need to address "very difficult ques-
tions." Id. at 35. For other commentary on the Court's response during argu-
ments, see James Vicini, Supreme Court May Not Decide Case of Death-Row
Mexican, REUTERS, Mar. 28, 2005, at
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2005/03/28/supreme-co
urtmaynot decidecaseofdeathrowmexican] (last visited Aug. 7, 2005);
Staff Writer, U.S. Death Penalty and Foreigners, CBSNEWS.COM, Mar. 28,
2005, at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/03/28/supremecourtjmain683532.shtml
(last visited Aug. 7, 2005).
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the writ.'81
4. United States' Withdrawal from the Optional Protocol
to the Vienna Convention
Less than two weeks after the President issued the Order
requiring the state courts to give effect to the Avena decision,
the United States withdrew from the Optional Protocol to the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, which gives the
ICJ jurisdiction over Vienna Convention claims.182 According
to State Department spokeswoman Darla Jordan, the U.S.
withdrawal from the protocol was necessary for "protecting
against future International Court of Justice judgments that
might similarly interpret the consular convention or disrupt
[the U.S.] domestic criminal system in ways [the U.S.] did not
anticipate when [it] joined the convention."' 1" It is notewor-
thy that the United States did not withdraw from the Vienna
Convention, but only the Optional Protocol; therefore, the
United States is still bound by its obligations under the Con-
vention. The effect of the withdrawal from the Optional Pro-
tocol, therefore, is that the United States no longer avails it-
self of the ICJ's jurisdiction to interpret and apply the Vienna
Convention."
181. Medellint., at 2089 ). These difficult questions include:
Is the Supreme Court the sole organ to decide what a treaty means as
it apples to a case in American court? Must the Court accept an inter-
pretation of a treaty that the President has spelled out? Can an inter-
national court confer on individuals private rights that are enforceable
in U.S. courts? Must the Supreme Court act to carry out a decision of
the World Court? What constitutional principle would support the
Presidents' view that an international treaty imposes binding obliga-
tions on the Supreme Court? Can the President dictate to state courts
that they must follow a decision of the World Court in their own state
criminal proceedings?
Lyle Denniston, Medellin case: the Court Hesitates, SCOTUSBLOG, Mar. 28,
2005, at
http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/2005/03/medellin-caset.html
(last visited Aug. 7, 2005).
182. See Charles Lane, U.S. Quits Pact Used in Capital Cases: Foes of Death
Penalty Cite Access to Envoys, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 10, 2005, at A01, avail-
able at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A21981-2005Mar9.html
(last visited Sept. 13, 2005).
183. Id.
184. It is debatable whether the United States' withdrawal from the Optional
Protocol is valid. According to the Vienna Convention on Treaties, a country
may not unilaterally terminate its membership of a treaty. The United States,
however, has not ratified this treaty. The debate arises at this level because
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III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEMS
The Vienna Convention cases presented to the U.S. Su-
preme Court and the ICJ involved both domestic and interna-
tional law; therefore, there are both domestic and interna-
tional issues. The first issue is the United States' continuous
violation of Article 36, paragraph one, of the Vienna Conven-
tion by failure to inform the detained foreign nationals of
their consular rights. The second issue is the United States'
failure to provide adequate review and reconsideration to for-
eign nationals alleging Vienna Convention violations, as re-
quired by paragraph two of the Convention.
The conflict within the U.S. government, specifically be-
tween the executive branch and the judicial branch, and be-
tween the state and federal government, is a third issue cre-
ated by recent development in the Vienna Convention law.
The conflict between the executive branch and the judicial
branch exists because the Presidential Order requires the ju-
diciary to review and reconsider the Mexican foreign nation-
als' claims, a decision typically within the realm of the courts.
Also, because the order originates in the federal government
and imposes requirements on the state courts, it infringes
upon state sovereignty.
Lastly, the United States' withdrawal from the Optional
Protocol to the Vienna Convention poses potential problems
in the international community and may ultimately put U.S.
citizens arrested abroad at a heightened risk. Other govern-
ments may follow the precedent of the United States and not
inform U.S. nationals of their rights to consular assistance
because there is no tribunal from which the United States can
seek assistance. Worse yet, these governments may follow
the United States' conduct and try U.S. nationals, convict
them, and sentence them to death without ever allowing the
U.S. consulate to intervene.
IV. ANALYSIS
Despite two ICJ decisions finding the United States in
some academics would argue that the Vienna Convention on Treaties is cus-
tomary international law, and therefore, binding on all states. The United
States would likely contest this assertion. This comment will not address these
issues further, as it is best suited for discussion in a separate article.
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violation of its obligations under the Vienna Convention,185
the United States remains inconsistent in how it treats for-
eign nationals upon arrest, how it conducts the required re-
view and reconsideration, and how it views the authority of
the 1CJ. The U.S. government has been inconsistent in its re-
sponse to the issues, thus compounding the problems faced by
the courts. The granting of certiorari in Medellin was a sub-
stantial step in addressing the conflict between international
and U.S. domestic law. Nevertheless, as evidenced by the
Justices' responses during oral arguments and its dismissal of
the writ, the conflict has been allowed to remain. Even if the
Court does resolve the case on subsequent review, it may be
insufficient given the narrowness of the issue before the
Court. The Presidential Order, which made its own determi-
nation, created a short-term solution for the foreign nationals
referred to in Avena, but it did not resolve the problem of vio-
lations of paragraph one or two more generally, and it did
create serious questions of Executive authority.
A. Initial Violations of the Vienna Convention by the United
States
The United States' continuous defiance of Article 36,
paragraph one, requiring law enforcement officials of member
states to notify detained foreign nationals of their right to
consular assistance,"' resulted in two ICJ decisions finding
the United States in breach of its obligations. The violations
display arresting officials' failure to protect the rights of for-
eign nationals upon arrest.'87 Despite the recurring viola-
185. See LaGrand Case (FRG v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 260 (June 27) available at
http://www.icj-cij.org (last visited Aug. 7, 2005).
186. See Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 36(2).
187. See NOAH LEAVITT, How THE U.S. SUPREME COURT RECENTLY REFUSED
TO ENFORCE U.S. LAW, Nov. 20, 2003 at
http'//writ.corporate.findlaw.com/commentary/20031120_leavitt.html (last vis-
ited Aug. 7, 2005). According to the Death Penalty Information Center, the
United States has executed twenty-one foreign nationals since 1976. MARK
WARREN, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, FOREIGN NATIONALS, PART II:
CONFIRMED FOREIGN NATIONALS EXECUTED SINCE 1976, (May 15, 2004) at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=31&did=582#executed (last
visited Aug. 21, 2005). As of May 2005, there were 118 foreign nationals on
death row. MARK WARREN, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, FOREIGN
NATIONALS AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES: REPORTED
FOREIGN NATIONALS UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH IN THE U.S. (May 28, 2005) at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=198&scid=31 (last visited Aug.
21, 2005). Many of these executed foreign nationals and those on death row
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tions, the United States asserted that it is doing its best to
abide by its obligations through educational programs aimed
at the country's law enforcement." In the Avena filings,
counsel for the United States presented statistics to show the
United States' effort to comply with the Vienna Convention.'89
In explaining why not all law enforcement officers have been
educated or been following their duties, a lawyer for the State
Department stated that the United States' attempts should
be sufficient given the size of the country.9 ° She declared
that "[a]s a practical matter, a country the size of the United
States would never have accepted an obligation that would
have put the ordinary conduct of criminal investigations and
public safety at jeopardy." 91
The United States' position may be a logical explanation
for the occurrence of violations, but the United States signed
and ratified this treaty, so it had the responsibility to evalu-
ate its obligations under the treaty, as well as its ability to
satisfy them, before agreeing to be a member. Criminal in-
vestigations and public safety are only put in jeopardy if the
United States fails to afford the foreign nationals their rights.
This is no different from other due process protections af-
forded to individuals in the criminal justice system. More-
over, it is unfair for the United States to selectively abide by
the Vienna Convention,9 ' while expecting full compliance
from other nations. The frequency of violations and the neg-
ligence in ensuring compliance of the treaty show that the
were deprived of their right to advisement of consular notification. See
LEAVITT, supra.
188. See Adam Liptak, Mexico Awaits Hague Ruling on Citizens on U.S.
Death Row, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2004, at Al. There have been 100,000 copies of
compliance manuals and 600,000 pocket cards delivered to local law enforce-
ment. However, there are 700,000 law enforcement officials. See id.
189. See id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See MARK WARREN, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, FOREIGN
NATIONALS AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES: CONSULAR
RIGHTS, FOREIGN NATIONALS AND THE DEATH PENALTY, May 28, 2005 at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=198&scid=31#background (last
visited Aug. 25, 2005). In capital cases, in only seven cases out of 160 reported
death sentences did officials completely comply with Article 36 of the Conven-
tion. In New York City, in 1997, there were only four cases in which consulates
were notified out of 53,000 foreign nationals arrested. Even if a majority of de-
tained foreign nationals declined assistance, the failure rate is still over ninety-
nine percent. Id.
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problem is perhaps complacency or a disinterest in resolving
the problem, rather than an inherent complication due to the
size of the United States.
B. Conflict between International Law and Domestic Law-
Can the Procedural Default Doctrine Be Applied?
The United States has a strong tradition of a separation
of state and federal power. As noted earlier, the procedural
default doctrine serves to preserve this division, so that a pe-
titioner does not seek a decision in federal court when the
state court had no opportunity to act on it. In Breard, the
U.S. Supreme Court established that the procedural default
rule applied to cases alleging Vienna Convention violations.
193
However, the ICJ, in LaGrand and Avena, held otherwise, be-
cause the doctrine does not allow claimants to have their
claims of violations adequately reviewed and reconsidered.
9 4
These holdings provided greater instruction as to the re-
quirements of paragraph two of Article 36, which expressly
requires only that full effect be given to the purpose of para-
graph one.
The LaGrand and Avena rulings allowed the United
States to choose its own method of review and reconsidera-
tion, but U.S. compliance has been slow and inconsistent. Af-
ter the decision in LaGrand, the United States did not change
its procedure or address the conflict of law that this holding
created. The denial of certiorari in Torres,99 in which Torres
claimed that the procedural default doctrine was applied in
violation of LaGrand, was an indication that the Court did
not find it necessary to resolve the conflict of law. Moreover,
the denial illustrated the view that the ICJ does not have au-
thority over the United States, and so no action was neces-
196
sary.
193. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998).
194. See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 279.
195. See Torres v. Mullin, 540 U.S. 1035 (2003).
196. The view that the ICJ does not have jurisdiction over the United States
helps explain why the United States did not take necessary action to ensure
that stays of execution were honored. The ICJ has ordered provisional meas-
ures in all three ICJ Vienna Convention cases, and every time, the United
States chose not to take action to enforce these orders. Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.) 1998 I.C.J. 246 (Apr. 9) available at
http'//www.icj-cij.org (last visited Aug. 7, 2005); LaGrand (FRG v. U.S.), 2000
I.C.J. 236 (Mar. 3, 1999) available at http://www.icj-cij.org (last visited Aug. 7,
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Failure to take action and provide an effective review and
reconsideration process resulted in a paragraph two, in addi-
tion to paragraph one, violation being alleged in Avena.
When the United States responded to the allegation of a
paragraph two violation, knowing the ICJ had already held in
LaGrand that the United States' procedures were inadequate,
the United States did not claim that the ICJ lacked jurisdic-
tion or that its rulings were not binding.97 Instead, the
United States made two other arguments.
First, the United States recognized and recited, in its
written counter-memorial, the rule stated in LaGrand regard-
ing the use of the procedural default doctrine.198 However, the
United States proposed a different interpretation of the La-
Grand ruling than that suggested by Mexico.'99 The United
States argued that the review and reconsideration process did
not have to be through the court system, but instead, through
any means of the United States' choosing.2 °° Accordingly, the
United States argued that the fifty-one Mexican nationals
were given access to review and reconsideration both through
the judicial and the clemency process.20 ' In response to the
United States' argument, a lawyer and director for the Mexi-
can Capital Legal Assistance Program responded: "[the
United States says the only remedy a defendant is entitled to
is an opportunity to beg for mercy... . But we're talking
about a legal right. It requires a legal remedy.""2 Thus, Mex-
ico claimed that the clemency process was insufficient to pro-
vide review and reconsideration.
The United States' argument appeared to be a weak at-
tempt at explaining its violations. Since the LaGrand hold-
ing, the United States did not take any major steps to ensure
2005); Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Or-
der, Request For the Indication of Provisional Measures, Feb. 5, 2003, 42 I.L.M.
309 at http'J/www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusorder/imusiorder_20030205.PDF, 59 (last
visited Aug. 7, 2005); see Hull, supra note 118.
197. See Counter-Memorial of the United States of America (Mex. v. U.S.),
(Avena and other Mexican Nationals) (Nov. 3, 2003) at http://www.ICJ-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imuspleadings/imusipleadings_20031103_c-
mem_06.pdf (last visited Aug. 7, 2005).
198. See id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See Liptak, supra note 188.
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compliance with the ICJ's findings, so, when it had to respond
in Avena, the government simply claimed that the current
procedures were adequate, when the ICJ had already ruled
that they were not. The United States simply argued that
clemency was an adequate remedy (the same remedy as used
when the ICJ found against the United States in LaGrand),
thus requiring the ICJ to be even more precise and proclaim
specifically that the clemency proceedings, as conducted in
the United States, are insufficient. The effect of this ruling is
that it is necessary for the United States to provide, to these
petitioners, a remedy different from clemency. The manner of
creating such a process has created conflict.
The United States' second defense was that although the
ICJ has jurisdiction to decide questions arising under the Vi-
enna Convention, it does not have jurisdiction to determine
by "highly specific means" what nations must do to comply. °3
The United States claimed that the ICJ directives with re-
gard to these specific issues are not binding.2 4 Instead, it
finds only that there is jurisdiction to decide general issues.2 5
The United States may not like the ICJ decisions, but the ICJ
did go through a process to interpret and apply the treaty,
and it rendered a decision accordingly. Also, the ICJ was
very deferential to the United States by allowing the United
States to determine its own method of compliance; the ICJ
only stated that the current U.S. system was inadequate.
Therefore, this defense was also a very weak explanation for
its actions.
The Avena holding, unlike the LaGrand holding, seemed
to have a greater impact on the U.S. legal system. The Okla-
homa Court of Criminal Appeals and Governor's issuance of a
stay of Torres's execution, in light of the Avena decision, was
an exception to U.S. inaction. Governor Henry's decision is a
victory because he recognized that the detaining official vio-
lated Torres's rights under the Convention."6 Additionally,
Henry noted that compliance with the treaty is important for
the protection of U.S. citizens arrested abroad.2 7 Granting
clemency showed that the ICJ's holding did have an impact
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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on the U.S. judicial system. Still, not all states agreed with
the authority of the 1CJ. Only days after Torres was granted
clemency, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Medel-
lin's habeas claim and petition for a COA in which the same
Vienna Convention violations, as in Oklahoma, were raised.
This difference of opinion showed a split in lower court inter-
pretation of ICJ authority.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Medellin directed its atten-
tion to this conflict of international and domestic law that had
created confusion among the lower courts. The Court's inter-
est appeared to be domestic, as opposed to international or
humanitarian, because the Court allowed the conflict to re-
main unresolved long after LaGrand first created it. Grant-
ing certiorari in Medellin, for whatever reason, presented a
good opportunity for the Court to address these issues. How-
ever, during oral arguments, the Court expressed concern
about yielding to the ICJ. Justice Scalia questioned the peti-
tioner's counsel as to whether the Court has ever been "bound
by a judgment of a. foreign court or an international court
concerning the meaning of United States Law.""8 Then Jus-
tice O'Connor asked whether the Court must apply Avena as
a "rule of decision" or whether the Court was open to inter-
pret the treaty itself; the petitioner hesitantly replied in the
affirmative that the Court may in fact intrepret the treaty it-
self.2°9 The Court has also expressed a strong desire to avoid
answering the difficult questions that would accompany a de-
cision in Medellin. Thus, despite lower court confusion and
ongoing conflict between the ICJ's rulings and U.S. law, the
Court contended that because the difficulty of the issues is so
high and because there is a remedy for the petitioner, it may
not decide the issues, even if clearly important. The Court
ruled to dismiss the writ and, thus, avoided any resolution of
these issues.
The February 2005 Presidential Order provides a means
of review and reconsideration for the Mexican nationals men-
tioned in the Avena case, but the narrowness of the Order
does not allow review and reconsideration for other foreign
208. For a transcript of the oral arguments, see Medellin v. Dretke, No. 04-
5928, at 13, at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/04-
5928.pdf (last visited Aug. 7, 2005).
209. Id. at 13-15.
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nationals, current or future, with the same Vienna Conven-
tion claims. The Order does completely comply with the ICJ
decision in that the remedy is given to the named Mexican
nationals, but its narrowness is indicative of the Executive's
intent to comply only as a matter of grace in this one in-
stance, but not to follow what the ICJ has determined to be a
requirement under the Vienna Convention. However, since
the Court's decisions are only applicable to the named parties,
the United States is not obligated to provide further protec-
tion under the ICJ reparations order in Avena. The United
States' intent to comply only in this specific instance is evi-
dent from the Order's language that the ICJ was being fol-
lowed as a matter of comity, and not as a matter of interna-
tional obligation. Although the ICJ decision is only applicable
to the named parties, the interpretation of the treaty obliga-
tions was consistent in both cases brought before the ICJ.
Therefore, the United States should know its treaty obliga-
tions under paragraph two of Article 36 and should imple-
ment a permanent review and reconsideration process that
will comply with this interpretation.
A remedy, at least for now,21° has been granted to the
Mexican nationals, but its narrowness will not protect others.
A future Supreme Court decision in Medellin also will do lit-
tle to solve the problem. As with the Presidential Order, the
issues that could, again, be presented to the Court in Medel-
lin are narrowly tailored to cover the Avena holding, which
applies only to the named parties. Therefore, following the
Presidential Order and even if the Court holds in favor of the
petitioner, lower courts are still left without guidance on how
to address future cases. If the situation remains the same, it
is likely that courts will continue to be divided on whether to
apply the procedural default doctrine to these cases.2 1 1
210. There is no indication what may happen if a state court refuses to com-
ply with the Presidential Order. The refusal to hear the case would likely go to
the U.S. Supreme Court to determine whether a president, in the first place,
had the authority to require state courts to undertake this review and reconsid-
eration.
211. Even though the United States withdrew from the Optional Protocol,
which means that there will be no more ICJ decisions against the United
States, violations will still likely continue, and there is no framework setup to
determine how these cases should be handled.
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C. Authority of the Presidential Order
The Executive's issuance of the Presidential Order com-
manding state courts to review and reconsider, as a matter of
comity, the cases of the fifty-one Mexican nationals will likely
create serious conflict. In some instances, all appeals and ha-
beas hearings have been conducted and the petitioner is
awaiting execution. Thus, the judicial proceedings will be re-
opened, slowing down the state's process of criminal justice.
As Texas stated, the executive branch's issuance of such an
order may be beyond the limits of its authority.212 Mr. Cruz,
on behalf of Texas, told the Court during oral arguments that
"there are significant constitutional problems with a unilat-
eral Executive determination displacing generally applicable
criminal laws."213 If a state court, like Texas, does not agree
with the validity of this Order, it is likely that it may refuse
to grant the review and reconsideration to the Mexican na-
tionals, or it may litigate the validity of the Presidential Or-
der before granting such review."' If the state courts do re-
fuse to grant new hearings to these petitioners, the case will
likely go up on appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court to verify the
validity of the Order.
An order such as this has serious implications for states.
Given the United States' concern not to "interfere with [the
states'] sovereign right to administer. . . criminal justice sys-
tem," "' the Order is perplexing. The Court had previously re-
inforced the separation of state and federal powers, at least
within the courts, when it ruled in the FRG petition that the
Court did not have jurisdiction to allow a case against Ari-
zona, because of the Eleventh Amendment's prohibition of
federal courts from taking lawsuits against a U.S. state when
filed by a foreign state.216 The Executive either appears less
concerned with the implications of making such a require-
ment, or it believes this Order to be the simplest and most ef-
fective way to achieve its goals, whatever they might be. Ei-
212. Amici Curiae Brief, at 50, Medellin (No. 04-5928).
213. Medellin v. Dretke, No. 04-5928, at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/04-
5928.pdf, at 33.
214. See id.
215. See Hull, supra note 118.
216. See Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 112
(1999); see also WIKIPEDIA, supra note 75.
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ther way, it is likely that a battle will ensue, at least in
Texas.
Not only is there concern with the federal government
impeding on the rights of states, but the Presidential Order
also interferes with the rights of the judiciary. The Order, as
noted in a brief to the U.S. Supreme Court, stated that since
the President had determined to apply the Avena decision as
a matter of comity, granting the Mexican nationals a remedy,
there was no longer a need for the Court to address the issue.
Justice Kennedy, in oral arguments for the Medellin case,
asked whether the President had the authority to unilaterally
interpret the treaty to be binding on the Court.217 The Court
was expressing a dislike for the determination that the Court
had its hands tied by the Order, as opposed to being able to
make its own determination.
D. United States' Withdrawal from the Optional Protocol for
the Vienna Convention
By withdrawing from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna
Convention, the United States sent the unequivocal message
that it no longer accepts the ICJ's jurisdiction to adjudicate
allegations of violations under the treaty.218 This shows the
world that the United States wants the protections of the
treaty, but that because of its consistent violations of the
Convention and its unwillingness to create a long-lasting
remedy for all claimants, it does not want to be under the ju-
risdiction of a court that can find such a violation. The effect
of the U.S. withdrawal may be serious, because we can no
longer avail ourselves of the ICJ's protections. The United
States was the first party to avail itself of the ICJ's jurisdic-
tion under the Optional Protocol when Iran took U.S. nation-
217. Federal Republic of Germany, 526 U.S. at 115. This is likely to be a
highly contentious question. The U.S. Supreme Court expressed its concern
about the assertion of the President's power. However, according to the Ameri-
can Law Institute, "[t]he President of the United States, or an appropriate offi-
cial acting under this authority, has the authority to determine the interpreta-
tion of an international agreement to be asserted by the United States in the
conduct of its foreign relations." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 149 (1965), cited in JOHN NORTON
MOORE, THE NATIONAL LAW OF TREATY IMPLEMENTATION 117-18 (Carolina
Academic Press 2001). The validity of the Presidential Order is likely to be liti-
gated in the future.
218. As stated before, the validity of the United States' withdrawal is still
uncertain, and such a discussion is beyond the scope of this comment.
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als hostage.2 9 Now, withdrawal from the Optional Protocol
will not allow the United States to have such a privilege, and,
particularly in a time when the administration is concerned
with national security, it seems incongruous to reject the one
tribunal that can render a decision in Vienna Convention
220
cases.
E. Reason behind the United States'Non-Compliance
Article 59 of the ICJ statute and Article 94(1) of the
United Nations Charter reiterate that ICJ decisions are bind-
ing on all member parties. 22' Despite this reality, the penalty
for not abiding by the rulings is virtually non-existent.
The United States has articulated several reasons behind
its past non-compliance with its obligations under the Vienna
Convention: the size of the country makes it prohibitive to in-
form all law enforcement officers; it believes that the clem-
ency process is sufficient for review and reconsideration; and
federalism prevents the federal government from enforcing
certain ICJ decisions, such as provisional measures, on state
courts.222  Even though these are likely some of the reasons
behind non-compliance, another likely reason is that there is
no authoritative force to require compliance. There is a sen-
timent among nations that the United Nations is not an au-
thoritative body, resulting in the view that ICJ decisions are
not binding.23 There is no penalty besides international scru-
tiny, and perhaps reciprocation, 221 for non-compliance.
219. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Te-
hran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24), http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/icases/iusir/iusir-ijudgment/iusir-iJudgment_19800524.pdf (last
visited Aug. 7, 2005).
220. In all reality, the United States probably does not feel that it needs the
ICJ to protect its citizens. All member states are still obligated to abide by the
treaty, and if one State was to violate the treaty, the United States may chose to
use its own methods of dealing with the problem.
221. See Stephanie Baker, Germany v. United States in the International
Court of Justice: An International Battle Over the Interpretation of Article
Thirty-six of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Provisional
Measures Orders, 30 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 277, 281 (2002).
222. The federalism concern seems to have been negated by the Executive's
decision to issue the Presidential Order.
223. See Baker, supra note 222, at 281.
224. It seems unlikely that less-developed nations will reciprocate against
the United States, because of the United States' ability to provide economic as-
sistance to some of these countries. For example, Paraguay dropped its case in
the ICJ after only an apology. See Aceves, supra note 73, at 927. The request
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This view is further supported by the fact that nations
have historically not been held accountable for breaches of in-
ternational obligations."5 The primary mechanism for enforc-
ing international conduct is through the U.N. Security Coun-
cil. Given this, and the fact that the United States is a
permanent member on the Council with veto power,26 this
mechanism to enforce compliance with ICJ judgments will
fail. 27 Even though it is unlikely that official penalties will
follow non-compliance, the United States and any non-
complying nation may face international pressure to comply
with its obligations. 28
F. ICJ's Response to the United States' Non-Compliance
The consistency in the ICJ's findings against the United
States, expresses the ICJ's disapproval of U.S. tactics. All of
the ICJ orders have been general in that they do not specifi-
cally tell the United States what is necessary for the review
and reconsideration process to be in compliance with the
Convention. This is most likely a product of three things: (1)
uncertainty about exactly what standard must be met; (2) the
level of familiarity with the U.S. criminal justice system; and
(3) respect for the sovereignty of the nations before the ICJ.
Although it is clear the ICJ finds the current U.S. review and
reconsideration procedure inadequate, there appears to be
uncertainty about what exactly the ICJ justices expect from
the United States and hesitancy to provide more specific
guidelines. This is not necessarily negative because if the ICJ
gave specific means by which the United States had to com-
ply, the lCJ would be intruding on the United States' right to
administer justice in its own system. However, the burden
should be on the United States to take action to meet its obli-
for dismissal perhaps points to a greater concern of Paraguay than that which
was satisfied by a public apology. As long as the United States is in a superior
position, it remains difficult to influence its politics through international
courts.
225. See Baker, supra note 222, at 281.
226. DR. DANESH D. SAROOSHI, SECURITY COUNCIL,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/gensc.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 2005). If
any country on the Security Council uses its veto power, the resolution will not
pass. See id. Therefore, if the United States vetos a proposal to take action
against the United States for its noncompliance with the ICJ decisions, such an
initiative will fail.
227. See id.
228. See id.
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gations, even if not specifically known; it knows that what it
is doing now is insufficient, so it should amend its procedure
to attempt to meet compliance.
In both LaGrand and Avena, the ICJ issued three sets of
provisional orders requiring stays of executions and twice
found the United State's actions in violation of the Vienna
Convention, Article 36, paragraphs one and two. Given the
United States' continued defiance of ICJ orders, the ICJ re-
acted with linguistic changes. For example, in the first two
orders of provisional measures to protect Breard and La-
Grand, the ICJ indicated that the United States "should take
all measures at its disposal" to prevent the executions of
these individuals until the ICJ heard the case.229 The lan-
guage "should take" was not a command, but more passive.
After two failed attempts to stay executions, the ICJ not only
ruled that this defiance was a breach of an obligation, but it
also made the language in the Avena provisional measures
more forceful: the United States "shall take all measures nec-
essary" to prevent the executions of the protected individu-
als.23° "Shall take," unlike "should take," is a command, and
the ICJ's intent is clear. This provision was effective with re-
spect to Torres in that Oklahoma granted the temporary stay
as requested by the United States. It was less effective with
respect to Texas which refused to take the ICJ's request into
consideration. Additionally, the United States did not act to
prevent an execution, likely because of its concern not to "in-
terfere with [the states'] sovereign right to administer...
criminal justice system."2 l
The ICJ clearly found the United States in violation of its
treaty obligations, and this is evident through consistent
judgments against the United States and the linguistic
changes made to try to better articulate its expectations. Re-
gardless of the ICJ's attempts, as mentioned before, there is
no means of enforcing compliance with the judgments, so the
attempts may be overall ineffective.
229. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1998 I.C.J. at 249; LaGrand,
2000 I.C.J. at 236.
230. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, 42 I.L.M. 309,
59.
231. See Hull, supra note 118.
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V. PROPOSAL
A. Ending Non-Compliance
The best approach to avoid further Vienna Convention
problems is to prevent the initial violation under paragraph
one of Article 36. This must be done by improving educational
measures at all levels of law enforcement, including police,
lawyers, and judges. Incorporating the advisement of the
right to consular assistance into the Miranda warning is an
option that would establish a sound U.S. practice of informing
foreign nationals of their rights; there would be greater cer-
tainty that all detained persons would be advised of their
rights, thus limiting the instances of violations. This option,
however, will likely be met with resistance by law enforce-
ment officials.
At the very least, if advisement is not an automatic duty,
all government officials should be aware of the Vienna Con-
vention obligations and be trained to recognize when to make
such an advisement. If the arresting officials fail in their du-
ties, the district attorney should be responsible for ensuring
that these rights are honored once the case is assigned to
them, and definitely before trial. However, because of the
passage of time before a district attorney is assigned, law en-
forcement may have already questioned the detained person
for hours, days, or even weeks. Therefore, there is a strong
likelihood that the defendant would already be prejudiced by
a confession or some other action that may be used as evi-
dence of his guilt.
If the justice system was to enforce these treaty rights
through mitigation or dismissal of the charges, law enforce-
ment officers would be much more likely to comply upon ar-
rest. If the information gathered from the suspect is gained
without notifying the suspect of his rights, that information
should not be admissible as evidence against the defendant in
court. Of course, the community rightfully wants to protect
itself from dangerous criminals, but if officials comply with
the treaty, there is no risk to public safety.
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B. Creation of a Review and Reconsideration Process
Since violations are likely to continue, it is necessary to
establish a review and reconsideration process. Since the
Presidential Order mandating state courts to review and re-
consider the cases of the Mexican foreign nationals listed in
the Avena case is limited to only those persons, the United
States has not taken precautions to ensure future compliance
with paragraph two of Article 36. The Order is extremely
positive in that it does grant a remedy to the petitioners in
Avena; however, its narrow scope means that foreign nation-
als not listed in Avena cannot benefit from the Order. The
United States is not creating a permanent procedure for re-
view and reconsideration of any foreign national's claim, and
thus, the application of the procedural default, at this time, is
still applicable and may prevent review of future claimant's
allegations of violations. There are three possible ways in
which the United States could remedy this problem and re-
solve any confusion among lower courts; each of the solutions
involves a different branch of government.
The United States can satisfy the requirements of para-
graph two and avoid future judicial inquiry into this issue if
congressional action is taken. If Congress agrees with the
binding nature of the ICJ's interpretation of paragraph two's
requirements, it could amend the current federal habeas cor-
pus statute and include an exception to the procedural default
doctrine, such that it could not be applied in Vienna Conven-
tion cases when application would deny the petitioner the
right to review and reconsideration of his Vienna Convention
claim. A narrow exception limited to this specific circum-
stance would put the United States in compliance with its Vi-
enna Convention obligations without seriously altering the
procedural default doctrine. This option is very difficult to
pursue because of the requirement of congressional action,
but it would be the most effective way of ensuring compliance
with respect to the review and reconsideration process.
A second option is for the president to clarify the Febru-
ary 2005 Presidential Order or issue a new order which ap-
plies to all foreign nationals that have been deprived of their
Vienna Convention rights. This act would be congruent with
the issuance of the February Order because that was done
based on principles of comity, and it logically follows that
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based on principles of comity, the United States should re-
spect the ICJ's interpretation that review and reconsideration
is required for all foreign nationals. This option may be the
easiest to implement, but the hardest to defend, because of
the possible claim that the president is overstepping his au-
thority by dictating how state courts handle their judicial
procedure.3 2 If this action is undertaken, it would improve
the United States' image to the international community, es-
pecially after the United States withdrew from the Optional
Protocol and jurisdiction of the ICJ. It would show that the
United States does respect the ICJ's interpretation of the
Convention and that the United States will comply with it.
The last option is for the U.S. Supreme Court to rule for
the petitioner in Medellin, if the case returns on subsequent
review. However, such a decision, if following the narrow is-
sues presented, will not affect the situation of any future for-
eign nationals making the case; the issues are limited to the
applicability of the Avena holding. If the Court wishes to
make a more substantial impact on this issue, its ruling must
be broader than the issues presented and must include lan-
guage that gives all foreign nationals the right to effective re-
view and reconsideration in light of the ICJ's determination
that current methods are inadequate. The holding would
deem the procedural default doctrine inapplicable in Vienna
Convention claims, overturning the decision in Breard. Addi-
tionally, the Court must decide that foreign nationals have an
individually recognizable right to enforce the treaty obliga-
tions.233
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States has violated its Vienna Convention
treaty obligations through inadequate implementation of
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. This has led to
consistent failures by arresting officials to inform foreign na-
tionals of their right to consular assistance and failures by
the courts to provide adequate review and reconsideration
232. The states have their own habeas laws, and an Order requiring review
in state habeas when the state statutes ban it could create conflict, like the cur-
rent conflict between Texas and the Presidential Order.
233. Since the Medellin case was dismissed as improvidently granted, these
options would only be available if the case returns to the U.S. Supreme Court on
later review.
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when such violations occur, thus preventing the full effect
and purpose to the Vienna Convention treaty. 34 The lack of a
sound U.S. policy on how to address Vienna Convention
claims has serious ramifications for foreign nationals-they
are left unprotected, despite the treaty. Now that the United
States has withdrawn from the Optional Protocol, other na-
tions cannot even bring claims against the United States to
the ICJ. Proper action must be taken to resolve the conflict
and uncertainty that are currently looming over courts facing
these issues. The action may take the form of legislative, ex-
ecutive, or judicial measures, and any of them would be a step
in a positive direction and a possible solution to this contro-
versy.
234. See supra Part IV.A.
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